



GENERAL PROBLEMS OF THE MODERN RESEARCH AND INNOVATION POLICY

<https://doi.org/10.15407/scine21.03.003>

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BUILDING A RESILIENT ECONOMY IN UKRAINE: UNLOCKING THE POTENTIAL OF THE GOVERNANCE SYSTEM

Introduction. *Overcoming the consequences of unprecedented shocks inflicted on Ukraine by Russian aggression requires effective governance as both a prerequisite and a critical factor for the recovery and rapid resilient development of the national economy.*

Problem Statement. *The weak capacity of the national governance system to promote both quantitative and qualitative economic growth has emerged as a critical issue that needs to be addressed.*

Purpose. *The purpose of this study is to identify the underlying causes for the governance system's limited capacity to create an institutional environment conducive to resilient economic development and to determine the priority strategies and mechanisms for strengthening this capacity.*

Materials and Methods. *This study has utilized published legislative documents and official statistical data, as well as verified findings from Ukrainian and international sociological studies and public opinion polls. The approaches and methods employed include systemic, institutional, dialectical, visualization, and both comparative synchronic and diachronic analyses.*

Results. *The study has demonstrated the necessity and identified the priorities for reforming Ukraine's governance system in order to establish parameters that will foster its independence from large (oligarchic) business interests and enhance its capacity to develop and implement policies that encourage economic and political competition, prioritize endogenous drivers of rapid economic growth, and ensure resilience and sustainability.*

Citation: Libanova, E. M., and Kotygorenko, V. O. (2025). Building a Resilient Economy in Ukraine: Unlocking the Potential of the Governance System. *Sci. innov.*, 21(3), 3–15. <https://doi.org/10.15407/scine21.03.003>

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Conclusions. *The findings have indicated that strengthening the potential of the governance system to build a resilient Ukrainian economy requires the de-hybridization of the system, along with its decentralization and democratization; the assurance of the rule of law; and the effective separation of legislative, executive, and judicial functions among independent bodies. In addition, the introduction of multi-stakeholder management practices with multifunctional coordination at national, regional, and local levels has been recommended.*

Keywords: governance system, economy, institutions, resilience, rule of law, multi-subject governance.

The development of human civilization is directly linked not only to new technologies but also to a renewed awareness of the meaning of human existence, the responsibility of the generations living today toward those to come, the role of various components in economic processes, and the justice in the distribution of wealth and resources. This awareness has crystallized at the end of the twentieth century in the Concept of Sustainable Development.

However, in recent decades the gradual evolutionary dynamics have been replaced by a rapid acceleration in the pace and depth of change, the swift emergence and diversification of new challenges, and the transformation of challenges into threats – and threats into shocks. This has produced new requirements for the ability of an economy to absorb and withstand shock and other destabilizing influences, to adapt quickly to changes, to transform while preserving its core functions, to recover, and to rise to levels higher than those prior to the crisis. The aggregate of these qualities is termed “resilience.”

Thus, resilience is defined as the capacity to recover from shocks and to adapt to change, primarily in the short term, whereas sustainability is the long-term ability of a system to withstand pressures and remain balanced.

Overcoming the consequences of the unprecedented shocks inflicted on Ukraine by hybrid, full-scale Russian aggression [1] requires effective governance as both a condition and a driver for the rapid, resilient recovery and sustained development of the national economy. The text presenting the research results on this imperative is divided into three parts. In the first part, the basic parameters of the concept of a resilient economy as a tool for scientific inquiry and social practices

have been delineated. In the second part, an original interpretation of the essence (inwardness) of the state governance system and its role in regulating economic processes has been provided, along with an emphasis on the relevance of multi-stakeholder management as an effective response to current challenges within the framework of the existing system for making official government decisions. In the third part, the characteristics and causes of the current state governance system’s inability to form an institutional environment conducive to economic growth have been described, and proposals for the institutional changes required for the system to become effective have been discussed.

The research has been conducted using scientific approaches and methods such as systemic, institutional, dialectical, visualization, as well as comparative synchronic and diachronic analyses. Sources of information on the object and subject of the study have included published documents of legislation and official statistics, along with verified results from opinion polls and scientific studies – especially those cited in this research.

Among the authors of these studies there have been both the Ukrainian researchers (O. Bilorus, P. Demchuk, O. Fisun, A. Grytsenko, V. Heyets, Yu. Kharazishvili, Y. Khrapunova, V. Kotygorenko, O. Krysenko, A. Kuts, E. Libanova, D. Mantsurov, I. Mantsurov, O. Mayboroda, O. Rafalskyi, S. Romaniuk, M. Skrypnychenko, T. Tyshchuk, and G. Zelenko) and the foreign ones (K. Van Assche, S. Baig, R. Beunen, J. Carlson, S. Davoudi, T. Debiel, A. Edgell, N. Evans, V. Fritz, A. Gani, R. Haffenden, O. Huss, F. Limongi, S. Maerz, L. Morlino, D. North, B. Peters, P. Pinto, A. Przeworski, H. Simon, J. Timmons, D. Williams, and C. Yenigun).

1. THE CONCEPT OF A RESILIENT ECONOMY AS AN INSTRUMENT FOR SCIENTIFIC INQUIRY AND MANAGEMENT PRACTICES

Despite the indisputable importance of sustainable development for the existence of human civilization, the ability to recover quickly from crises has acquired paramount significance. Ukraine has found itself in such a situation with the onset of full-scale aggression. Without the capacity to withstand and overcome shocks of catastrophic magnitude and continue functioning despite widespread destruction, it is futile to consider preserving resources for future generations — especially if a free, democratic Ukraine and new generations of Ukrainians do not exist. In this context, resilience has become the priority. The post-war development model may, at a certain stage, be oriented towards addressing the tasks and achieving the goals of sustainable development.

Resilience cannot have been achieved without the ability to forecast shocks — including an adequate assessment of the strength and character of disruptive forces — as well as the capacity to resist disturbances, adapt, and recover [2]. Although these capabilities are not always inherent to every system to the same extent, they determine the degree of resilience in each case.

In a wartime situation, the shock from the outset of the war is extremely severe and requires maximum efforts to preserve the system. In such circumstances, the system shall be capable of transforming rapidly, with absorption and adaptation playing only a supplementary role. Additional challenges are associated with the urgent need to mobilize substantial resources, including a significant portion of those that previously were allocated to meet the demands of peacetime. A notable exception is the duration of the shock: the full-scale aggression by the Russian Federation has persisted for over 2.5 consecutive years, and combat operations in certain regions of Ukraine have continued for more than 10 years. Among the most severe strikes there are psychological shocks with unpredictable consequences. People, infrastructure, the

economy, and the environment have all suffered extensive damage.

The ability of the economy to withstand the shocks of war is linked to the quality, speed, and strength of its response to armed conflict, to attacks on infrastructure, to ecological losses and threats, to the overall financial and economic downturn caused by the war, to the rising military component of budget expenditures, and to the reduction in revenues, among other factors. It is necessary to simultaneously repel the enemy, restore critical infrastructure, ensure the functioning of the economy, and maintain an acceptable standard of living for the population. All of these efforts require resources — financial, economic, energy, and, most importantly, human. Even with the receipt of substantial assistance, these resources have been pushed to the brink of exhaustion, and the post-war economy is likely to face significant resource shortages.

The economy is characterized by both static and dynamic capacities to rapidly restore its key functional and developmental indicators that have been deformed as a result of shocks of both economic and non-economic origin. Static resilience is associated with the effective allocation of available resources, while dynamic resilience is linked to the acceleration of recovery, particularly through the reconstruction of fixed assets. Accordingly, the former pertains to the maximally efficient use of resources available at a given moment in time, whereas the latter is oriented toward an upward developmental trajectory of the economy over time. Static resilience has demonstrated great potential for reducing recovery costs in a simple and relatively inexpensive manner, yet it has generally been outperformed by the more complex and costly dynamic resilience that focuses on the speed and quality of recovery.

The choice between a longer and less expensive economic recovery and a faster but more costly one also determines the pace of revival in other spheres of societal life. For instance, economic recovery affects the state of infrastructure — including critical infrastructure — the environment,

and the quality of life of the population, and consequently influences migration processes, birth and mortality rates, and the supply of labor. In turn, labor supply under conditions of workforce shortages directly influences the potential for economic development and the mitigation of the consequences of economic shocks.

The ability of the economy to respond to shocks is determined by its intrinsic properties, its resources (both actual and potential), and the available instruments. The primary spatial dimensions include the global, national, regional, and local levels, in accordance with the structure of the state. In Ukraine, it has been considered advisable to differentiate between the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the oblasts on one scale, and between urban/rural settlements and communities on another. Given the multifaceted nature of metropolises, their resilience has been measured and modeled separately.

The framework for forming local resilience does not fundamentally differ from that at higher levels – it exhibits the same dependence on resources, the state of critical infrastructure, the effectiveness of governance, the authority and functionality of government, and the capacity to manage available resources as well as to discharge responsibilities for ensuring the well-being of the population within the respective territorial entity. Similarly, the principle of interdependence among all components of the economic system, aimed at ensuring resilience in the face of challenges and threats, has been engaged. During the war, it has often been the grassroots levels that assume responsibility for decision-making and for implementing those decisions in governance practice. In the context of Ukrainian experience, it is worth recalling the territorial defense in the early months, the organization of daily life in frontline settlements, and, if necessary, the evacuation of the population, among other measures. All of these initiatives are organized by local institutions and local leaders.

Resilience has been applied as a conceptual foundation and organizational principle in the pre-

paration, approval, and implementation of numerous transnational EU projects: the Resilience Action Plan for Crisis-Prone Countries, the EU Strategy on Adaptation to Climate Change, the Framework Strategy for a Resilient Energy Union with a Forward-Looking Climate Change Policy, the EU Global Strategy, etc.

2. EFFECTIVE STATE GOVERNANCE AS A CONDITION AND FACTOR FOR POST-WAR RECOVERY AND RESILIENT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

The concept of resilience serves as the methodological foundation for defining the institutional instruments for Ukraine's post-war economic reconstruction. At the national level, the effectiveness of the national governance system plays an extremely important role in this process. In the contexts of systemic and institutional approaches, state governance is interpreted as a system of formal (regulated by law) and informal (nonlegal) institutions, including organizations, constitutions, and other normative legal acts, as well as informal established rules, customs, and traditions that structure the mechanisms and regulate the practices and interactions of the legislative, executive, and judicial authorities. These institutions influence the behaviors of individuals entrusted with carrying out corresponding governmental management functions. Although informal institutions do not have strict definitions, often they are as effective as the formal ones and sometimes even surpass them. Under certain conditions, they may acquire formal characteristics.

A characteristic feature of Ukraine's institutional environment has been the prevalence and influence of informal institutions that, though less organized, are as numerous and powerful as the formal ones. In general, the effectiveness of each institution always depends on its "embeddedness" within the network of other institutions and actors [3].

Nation is a multifaceted institution – an actor empowered to define the rules of economic and

other relations and to ensure that all participants in market and other social interactions within its territory, as well as beyond it when such interactions extend further, comply with these rules.

Institutions of state governance have to ensure the protection of property rights, and the formulation and implementation of macroeconomic policies aimed at creating and developing a competitive environment, introducing stable rules of competitive behavior, establishing mechanisms for preventing corruption and effectively combating it, and protecting national interests in interstate economic relations and on global markets.

Important components of effective state governance (good national governance) include neutralizing the threat of social conflicts, fostering the formation and development of high-quality human and social capital, and strengthening social cohesion among the citizenry and their trust in governmental institutions.

Among the methods of such governance there has been the accumulation of financial resources and their rational distribution – rational and socially efficient distribution, since the state budget never has sufficient funds to satisfy de facto unlimited needs. This issue is particularly relevant for Ukraine that, according to the World Bank's classification, belongs to the emerging markets/developing countries and has been severely weakened by the war.

An integral component in forming good national governance is the transition from mono-subjective, hierarchically and strictly centralized management to multi-subjective management. Among the ways to implement such forms of subjectivity, there are as follows: interaction between international structures and transnational corporations with the state; cooperation among different states to achieve common development goals; collaboration of individual regions/communities, represented by regional and local authorities, with regions/communities in other countries; interaction among various structures of civil society and the bodies of administration and local self-government; and public-private partnerships. These re-

lationships are formed on the principles of partnership, the alignment of rights and obligations, the obligatory imposition of sanctions for violating agreements, the maximal benefit for all participants, and the creation by the state of the necessary legal framework [4].

Accordingly, the types of multi-subjective management include as follows:

- ◆ Centralized hierarchical relationships with elements of vertical and horizontal coordination;
- ◆ Decentralized relationships between actors while preserving their autonomy (fully or partially);
- ◆ Regional relationships with elements of coordination;
- ◆ Functional relationships with elements of coordination; and
- ◆ Multi-level relationships among management actors at different levels and with different functions, featuring multifunctional coordination and interaction at regional, local, and/or functional levels.

Multi-subjective management substantially increases the capacity to manage the economy and society by facilitating the formulation and adoption of effective decisions regarding collective goals and determining the means to achieve them [5]. According to classical conceptions, a decision is understood as the process by which one of several alternatives is chosen for each moment of behavior [6].

Such an approach is especially important in the context of post-war reconstruction of a resilient economy and in countering the profound, long-term consequences of shocks of military origin. Coordination occurs under the conditions of a fundamental challenge – the divergence or contradiction of interests among individual actors [7]. An example of this is the conflicting interests between territorial communities with a large number of evacuated and relocated enterprises on one side, and communities from which the population and businesses have fled in response to military threats on the other. Both groups of communities have been highly interested in a strong human and economic potential, which forms the founda-

tion for their recovery, existence, and development. Therefore, in the post-war perspective, harmonizing the interests of communities becomes a primary task that can be most effectively addressed within the framework of a multi-subjective approach.

Supervision over compliance with the rules, norms, and procedures that facilitate the adoption and implementation of joint decisions by the actors is exercised by the actors themselves, and any violation results in the strict application of specific mutually agreed sanctions based on a broad institutional foundation. The activities of formal institutions are clearly defined within the legal framework, and non-compliance with the rules is penalized.

Examples of multi-subjective management of Ukraine's economy aimed at supporting its resilience under wartime conditions include subsidies from international structures to cover the budget deficit, the participation of businesses and the population in financing military needs through the targeted allocation of acquired equipment, the regulation by business associations of the scale and manner of providing public services, the organization of territorial defense, and the establishment of cooperation between local self-government bodies and the Armed Forces in the first weeks of full-scale war.

3. WHICH INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES DOES THE STATE GOVERNANCE SYSTEM REQUIRE TO BE EFFECTIVE?

Overcoming the consequences of military shocks and achieving a trajectory of qualitative and quantitative economic recovery and development require both non-traditional measures and an orientation toward global experience and the results of its scientific interpretation. This includes, in particular, multidimensional comparative studies of the determinants of economic growth in more than 80 developing countries. These studies that use various methodologies have reached convergent conclusions: government growth and improved institutional quality, reduced corruption,

investments, and human development play essential roles in economic growth [8, 9].

These findings have provided grounds to assert that the state governance system established in Ukraine is incapable of ensuring rapid upward economic dynamics, sustainability, and alignment with societal challenges and needs. Over the past more than 30 years, the average annual growth rates of the country's real gross domestic product and GDP per capita have ranked among the worst in the world [10–12]. The share of the shadow economy remains unacceptably high [13]. According to government estimates, in the year preceding the full-scale Russian invasion, it accounted for 32% of the official GDP [14]. Corruption has become an inherent attribute of state institutions' operations [15]. Although the anti-corruption infrastructure established after the Revolution of Dignity has produced certain positive results, they are significantly below expectations. A sociological study conducted in June 2023 on behalf of Transparency International Ukraine has shown that 73% of Ukrainians and 80% of business representatives were most concerned about the resurgence of corruption schemes in the country's recovery processes [16].

The primary cause of the economic inefficacy of Ukraine's governance system is that "big business has privatized the state using pseudo-democratic procedures," and that "the state supports a monopolistic position in the economy (a source of monopoly profits) and allocates state budget resources for the benefit of big business..." [17]; government institutions "are unable to effectively perform the functions of protecting the population in a broad sense," and are therefore compelled to seek external assistance [18]. There has been an institutionalization of economic — and to a large extent, political — dominance by oligarchic politico-economic groups [19].


Both Ukrainian [20, 21] and foreign researchers have emphasized the close relationship between state governance institutions and big business in Ukraine. The majority tend to explain the negative impact of this relationship on the eco-

nomy by the dominance of informal rules governing “hybrid regimes” of political power, which have been institutionalized in Ukraine since its sovereignty. The term “hybrid regime” is typically used to denote a mode of functioning of the political system and state governance that combines elements of democracy and authoritarianism. Such a regime is characterized by a weak system of checks and balances. Formal democratic institutions – elections, freedom of speech, the rule of law, etc. – have been more decorative than functional. Hybrid regimes can transform in various directions – either toward an expansion of democratic practices or toward the consolidation and expansion of authoritarian practices [22, 23].

In Ukraine, such transformations have manifested themselves as an alternation of authoritarian forms and fluctuations in the representation of competing groups of the ruling class, embodied by big (oligarchic) business and its affiliated politicians and (quasi-)political organizations/parties. Despite this, many analysts have insisted on preserving the existing system of state power [24].

In our view, this system requires disruptive institutional changes. Previous attempts to update the formal rules of state governance, as defined by the Constitution of Ukraine, have not eliminated the primary legal cause of the systematic recurrence of authoritarian practices. Hybrid regimes are not the cause of this recurrence; rather, they are its consequence – an inherent mode of operation.

In both the 1996 Constitution and its subsequent reformed versions, the granting of a range of powers to the President of Ukraine has been – and continues to be – the reason for which, according to the standards of separation of powers, these authorities should respectively and exclusively belong to the legislative, executive, and judicial branches. The President has also been endowed with legal instruments to influence the personnel composition and functioning of these branches. Moreover, the insufficient clarity of certain provisions in the Fundamental Law has created opportunities for the head of state to influence all



The hybrid presidential-centric system of national governance in Ukraine

Source: prepared by authors.

three state governance institutions and their activities, both formally and informally.

Analytical study of this feature [25] has provided grounds to characterize the current state governance system in Ukraine as a hybrid, president-centric model. The guarantor of this system is the President himself, both as an institution and as an individual (see Figure).

Meanwhile, the separation of powers and functions among the legislative, executive, and judicial branches is recognized as a necessary condition and an important factor for effective democratic state governance in all spheres of society, including the economic sphere. Such a separation is a hallmark of democratic societies and nations, into whose community Ukraine is aspiring to integrate. In these societies and nations, two well-tested models for organizing and functioning of political systems prevail.

According to one model, the President serves as the chief executive, accountable and answerable to the parliament (a “classic” example of such a parliamentary-presidential model is the United States). According to the other model, the executive authority is headed by a Prime Minister, who is likewise accountable and answerable to the parliament (this does not preclude the existence of a president or even a monarch, albeit with extremely limited and often purely ceremonial functions).

It is well known that no perfect system of state power exists. However, there have been grounds to believe that the parliamentary-prime ministerial model, with its built-in institutional safeguards against the threats of authoritarianism, is the most acceptable and compatible with the mentality of Ukrainians. Modern democracies who employ this model have achieved and continue to achieve outstanding economic and other successes in times of peace (e.g., Austria, Italy, the United Kingdom, Norway, Germany, Poland, Finland, Sweden, and Japan). This model has also demonstrated its effectiveness in countries that successfully function and develop under conditions of constant threat of war and even during actual conflict (e.g., Israel). Studying and applying the relevant experience has been extremely important for both the present and the future of Ukraine.

Equally, if not more importantly, it is crucial to draw appropriate conclusions from national governance practices before and during the full-scale Russian invasion. In response to this invasion, the President and the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine have implemented a legal regime of martial law along with legislative transformations in the governance system as prescribed by law.

According to the Constitution and other legal acts, the powers of coordination and control over the activities of executive authorities in the sphere of national security and defense during martial or emergency conditions and in the event of crises threatening national security are vested in the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine, headed by the head of state. However, the actual center of state governance has become the Office of the President [26]. The powers prescribed by Article 85 of the Constitution of Ukraine, which require the parliament to review and decide on the approval of the Cabinet of Ministers' Activity Program and to control its activities, have in practice not been implemented. The government and its officials report on their plans and performance directly to the Office, and in several instances, its officials perform the functions of government members. Public sentiment toward

such practices has been predominantly negative. The majority of citizens living in the Ukrainian territories controlled by the authorities, where no active hostilities take place, consider that the Office is influencing all branches of state power, exceeding its granted powers [27].

It is important that the informal rules and practices adopted during wartime are not perpetuated afterward. According to the constitutional lawyer D. Williams (USA), the popularity and public trust that President Zelenskyy has acquired during the war, in his roles as President and Supreme Commander-in-Chief, give him the opportunity to implement a democratically oriented constitutional reform that is better adapted to the needs of peacetime [28]. The implementation of this opportunity will have met the demands of society. The social survey results have shown that in Ukraine the share of supporters of a "strong leader" rapidly decreases, while the proportion of citizens who consider democracy to be the most desirable form of state organization increases [29–33].

To achieve and affirm an appropriate level of democracy, it becomes necessary to de-hybridize the governance system; that is, to develop and implement in laws and practices rules that will ensure a real – not merely declarative – separation of powers among the legislative, executive, and judicial branches. It has also been necessary to ensure the proper functioning – without external interference – of the anti-corruption institutional system established after the Revolution of Dignity. Among the most critical changes, there has been the continuation of decentralization and the renewal of state regional policy. Regional and local governments bear their share of responsibility for regulating economic processes and improving the quality of life. They better understand local needs, responded more quickly, managed resources more effectively, and, most importantly, are more accountable to their communities.

However, in Ukraine and among Western scholars, there has been no consensus regarding which model of governance – democratic or authoritarian – is more effective in ensuring economic

growth. Post-World War II economic miracles “include countries that had parliaments, parties, trade unions, and competitive elections, as well as countries governed by military dictatorships” [34].

This phenomenon has been explained by D. North, whose institutional paradigm was formed based on research into the history of economic change: short-term economic growth may occur under autocratic regimes, but long-term economic growth requires the development of the rule of law, as well as political and economic competition [35]. These three factors play productive economic activity. The creation of such an environment – rather than direct management of economic processes – has been identified as the primary task of national state institutions to ensure synergy between the endogenous and exogenous components of post-war reconstruction, growth, and economic resilience. In this context, the endogenous component has been considered a priority [36]. The significance of endogeneity has been emphasized by the National Report “Sustainable Development Goals: Ukraine” [37], as well as by the Reform Matrix approved by the Government in June 2024 as an analytical tool for effective decision-making and management of the reform process [38].

Government and government-encouraged private financing for R&D, rapid technological innovations, the protection of intellectual property, investments in human capital, and other endogenous factors increase the labor productivity, enhance the competitive and resilient capacity of the economy, and ensure rapid economic growth. This has been demonstrated by numerous comparative qualitative and quantitative studies, including the works of P. Pinto and D. Timmon. The authors have analyzed the results of their predecessors’ work, compared them with their own findings based on research into economic changes and their determinants in 90 countries across five continents, and have concluded that “political competition reduces the rates of accumulation of labor and capital but increases the rates of accumulation of human capital and... technological

innovations. Essentially, regimes with greater political competition may not grow faster or slower than less competitive regimes, but they grow differently – relying more on intensive rather than extensive growth...” [39].

Thus, the highest productivity of endogenous factors driving economic growth for the benefit of the entire society – or at least for the majority – is ensured by democratic regimes and the political competition inherent in them, including competition for voters’ support. Political leaders and bureaucrats in democratic countries are compelled to limit the size of the rents they receive from those on whom their hold on power depends. If they ensure economic growth, they then obtain the opportunity to continue working and to receive greater rents without increasing – and even by reducing – their share in overall economic results. The research has shown that this is one of the main reasons for the lower level of corruption in economically developed democratic countries compared to developing ones [40].

Conversely, authoritarian rulers have the opportunity, at least for a period, to appropriate large rents and to pay little attention to the welfare of their subjects – both when the economy grows and when it does not. Unlike democratic regimes, authoritarian regimes sometimes improve economic indicators by intensifying labor exploitation, which does not preclude their desire and capacity to ensure endogenous growth, although such growth is an exception rather than a rule.

This situation arises because “institutions are not necessarily, and not even always, created to be socially effective; rather, they – or at least formal rules – are created to serve the interests of those who hold the power to create new rules” [35].

For institutional rules and organizations to serve not only, or not primarily, the interests of those endowed with power but to function effectively for the benefit of the entire society, civil society must be involved in the “creation of new rules” in Ukraine. This includes associations representing the interests of domestic businesses of all sizes, as well as all socially active citizens. An open public

discussion regarding the necessity and direction of constitutional changes must begin immediately after the abolition of the martial law regime, during the conduct of presidential, parliamentary, and local elections, and must become one of the priorities of pre-election debates and subsequent actions by the newly elected authorities. The design of these changes cannot be delayed.

CONCLUSIONS

The full-scale aggression by the Russian Federation has caused a multitude of fundamentally new shocks in terms of nature and intensity — economic, energy, natural resource, socio-psychological, demographic, and others. Effective response to these shocks is a necessary condition for both military success and for post-war recovery and rapid resilient development of Ukraine's economy.

Among the primary factors for successful development there are the reform of the state governance system toward institutional de-hybridization, decentralization, and democratization; the creation of conditions for political and economic competition; the assurance of the rule of law; and the minimization of authoritarian threats through the real separation of powers — that is, through the real separation of legislative, executive, and judicial functions among separate institutions (bodies) of the national governance system.

Multi-subjective management with multifunctional coordination at the national, regional, and local levels has been identified as the primary mechanism for regulating economic processes and for preventing and eliminating threats to social cohesion in both its horizontal (among citizens and between communities) and vertical (between citizens and state governance institutions) dimensions.

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Received 05.11.2024

Revised 07.11.2024

Accepted 07.11.2024

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РОЗБУДОВА РЕЗИЛЬЄНТНОЇ ЕКОНОМІКИ УКРАЇНИ: ПОТЕНЦІАЛ СИСТЕМИ УРЯДУВАННЯ

Вступ. Подолання наслідків безпрецедентних шоків, яких Україні завдано російською агресією, потребує ефективного урядування як необхідної умови і чинника відновлення та швидкого резильєнтного розвитку національної економіки.

Проблематика. Слабка спроможність національної системи урядування сприяти кількісному та якісному зростанню економіки є проблемою, що потребує розв'язання.

Мета. З'ясувати причини слабкої спроможності системи державного урядування формувати середовище, сприятливе для резильєнтного розвитку економіки, та визначити пріоритетні шляхи і способи посилення інституційної спроможності цієї системи.

Матеріали та методи. Використано опубліковані документи законодавства та офіційної статистичної інформації, верифіковані результати українських і зарубіжних соціологічних досліджень, опитувань громадської думки. Застосовано дослідницькі підходи і методи: системний, інституційний, діалектичний, візуалізації, порівняльні синхронний та діахронічний.

Результати. Аргументовано необхідність та визначено пріоритети реформування системи державного урядування в Україні для набуття нею параметрів, що сприятимуть її незалеженню від великого (олігархічного) бізнесу та посиленню спроможності розробляти й утверджувати правила, які заохочуватимуть економічну та політичну конкуренцію, забезпечуватимуть пріоритетність ендогенної складової швидкого економічного зростання, його резильєнтність і сталість.

Висновки. Посилення потенціалу системи урядування у розбудові резильєнтної економіки України потребує деїбридизації цієї системи, її децентралізації та демократизації, забезпечення верховенства права й реального поділу функцій влади законодавчої, виконавчої та судової, запровадження практик полісуб'єктного управління з багатофункціональною координацією на національному, регіональному й місцевому рівнях.

Ключові слова: система державного урядування, економіка, інституції, резильєнтність, верховенство права, полісуб'єктне управління.